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N A T U R E O F P R O C E E D I N G S B E L O U I 
Pursuant to §78-2-2(1), Utah Code Annotated (1987), the 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear this appeal . Pursuant to 
the provisions o-f §78-2-2(4), UCA, this matter was transferred to 
the Court of Appeals. The jurisdiction o-f this Court is 
specified in §78-2a-3(2)(h), UCA. 
The matter was tried to the Court, without a jury. From a 
judgment in favor of respondent, appellants have appealed. The 
respondent has filed a cross-appeal, challenging the inadequacy 
of the award. 
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I S S U E S R R E S E K I T E D 
Appellants have stated the issues they wish the Court to 
consider on appeal. Respondent presents the following issues: 
1. Were the damages awarded by the Court sufficient? 
2. Was respondent entitled to punitive damages as a matter 
of 1 aw? 
3. Did the Court err in holding that respondent's record 
could be expunged? 
4. Is respondent entitled to his attorney fees on appeal? 
R E L_ E V A N T S T r f ^ T U T E S 
Appellants have suggested those statutes they felt were 
relevant. Respondent would suggest that §78-27-44 UCA, dealing 
with pre-judgment interest on damages arising from torts, is also 
applicable. 
S T A T E M E N T O R T H E C r f ^ S E 
A. NATURE OF THE CASEi 
Respondent's cause of action arose out of his false arrest 
by appellants. Respondent was detained for a search by 
defendants. Respondent voluntarily consented to appellants' 
search. The search revealed that there was nothing belonging to 
appellants on respondent. Notwithstanding, appellants caused 
respondent to be arrested. 
Paae 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW: 
Appellants' summary is a fair recitation of the proceedings 
and disposition below. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Appellants' "Statement of Facts" contain many undisputed 
facts. However. appellants' statement of the "facts" are so 
inter-twined with appellants' argument, that is difficult to 
ascertain where facts end and argument begins. As a result 
respondent suggests the following is a clearer recitation.1 
1. The defendant Deon Dove, is the sole owner and 
proprietor of a retail grocery store in Roosevelt, Utah, known as 
Dove's Happy Service. CT pg 201] 
2. On November 19, 1985, respondent was 18 years of age, a 
senior at Union High School in Roosevelt, and had no criminal 
record. CT pg 563 
3. On November 19, 1985, respondent, in the company of 
three friends, namely James Wymer, Mike Harmston and Toby Clark, 
(hereafter Wymer, Harmston and Clark, respectably), entered 
Dove's as business invitees. CT pg 58+] 
4. At the time in question, appellant Benito M. Van 
(hereafter Van), was employed by Deon Dove as a security guard, 
assigned to watch for shoplifters. CT pg 1933 
1
 Reference in the brackets is to the Transcript of the 
Trial, and identified by the letter "T". 
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5. Van claimed that when respondent and -friends entered 
Dove's, he was on a "catwalk" where he could look down and 
observe the entire store. Van claimed that from the catwalk he 
watched the respondent and his friends enter the store. CT pg 
212+3 
6. Wymer, who was with the respondent, knew Van from a 
church basketball program. CT pg 122] Wymer testified that he 
and the others "ran into" Van upon entering the store with 
respondent. Wymer testified that he stopped to talk to Van about 
the church athletic program, while the respondent, Clark and 
Harmston "went up the aisle." The conversation between Van and 
Wymer lasted at least 10 minutes. CT pgs 124; 62, 63; 2213* 
7. Respondent, Clark and Harmston left Wymer with Van and 
went to look for wire for Harmston's stereo. CT pg 62] 
8. In the section of the Dove's where respondent and his 
friends were looking for stereo wire, respondent observed a 
package containing a TV splitter. This package had been 
previously opened. CT pg 63+33 
2
 Wymer testified that he talked with Van at least 10 
minutes. Van testified on page 221, that he talked to Wymer for 
"about fifteen, twenty minutes." Wymer, Clark, Harmston and 
respondent testified that said conversation took place as they 
came into the store. Van testified that it occurred after he had 
watched the boys from the cat walk. Based on all of the 
testimony, respondent and his friends were in the store from 15 
to 20 minutes. 
3
 Van testified that he observed respondent open the 
package. Harmston, Clark and respondent each testified that the 
package was open when respondent first touched it. 
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9. Respondent did remove the splitter -from the previously 
opened container, to examine it. CT pg 63] Respondent was 
observed by Harmston and Clark, looking at the splitter. CT pgs 
155; 181, 1823 
10. Harmston personally observed respondent place the 
splitter at the end of the aisle, by the potato chips. CT pgs 
182, 1833 There was no attempt by respondent to conceal the 
splitter. CT pgs 66; 77; 793 
11. Respondent immediately joined his friends in the front 
of the store, at the magazine rack. CT pgs 67; 126; 1843 Wymer 
testified that as he left Van he went to the magazine rack, and 
had just started looking at a magazine when respondent arrived. 
Respondent and his friends did look through some magazines. CT 
673 
12. Respondent and his friends existed the store in two or 
three groups. CT pgs 68; 126+3 
13. Van and another employee of Dove's stopped respondent 
and requested that respondent come back into the store with them. 
CT pg 683 Van then stopped Clark and requested Clark to come 
back into the store with him. CT pg 1563 Clark and respondent 
voluntarily complied with the requests. CT pgs 69; 1573 
14. In the store, respondent and Clark asked Van what was 
wanted. Van told them he "had suspicions that they had been 
shoplifting." CT pgs 70; 1573 
15. Respondent informed Van that he (respondent) had not 
stolen anything. Clark and respondent each offered to be 
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searched. Van re-fused to search either o-f them until an officer 
from the Roosevelt Police Department arrived, CT pg 703 
16. When Officer Patton from the Roosevelt Police 
Department arrived, Patton asked "which one was it?" Van 
indicated "I'm not sure. We will have to search them both to see 
which one took the item." CT pg 71] 
17. At Van's request, both Clark and respondent were 
thoroughly searched by Patton. Officer Patton could not find 
anything on either Clark or respondent. CT pgs 71; 1583 
18. When Officer Patton was unable to find any stolen item 
on either Clark or respondent, Patton asked Van what he wanted to 
do. Van responded that he wanted respondent arrested. CT pg 71; 
2333 Respondent was then handcuffed and taken from Dove's by the 
Police. Many of his friends and associates witnessed the event. 
19. While respondent was being transported to the Police 
Department, Van went through the store, and found the splitter on 
a store shelf. CT pg 2233 Van claimed it was "behind" some 
potato chips. CT pg 2233 Respondent and Steve Harmston stated 
that it was left in plain sight. CT pgs 65; 182, 1833* 
20. After Van had located the splitter, he went to the 
Roosevelt Police station. It was then that Van formally signed a 
criminal complaint against respondent. CT pgs 72-753 
21. Respondent was finger printed, had a "mug-shot" taken, 
was booked and incarcerated. CT pg 753 Respondent was 
* Uan acknowledged that there were other customers in the 
store, and that another customer may have moved the splitter from 
where respondent had set it down. 
Paae 6 
informed by Officer Patton that the mug-shot and finger prints 
would be sent to be the FBI and retained Mfor ever." CT pg . 76D 
22. Bond was set in the sum of $106.00. Later that 
evening, respondent was bonded out by his mother. CT pg 753 
23. Respondent moved the Circuit Court to dismiss the 
criminal charges against him on the basis that he had not 
committed a crime. The matter was submitted to the Court upon 
stipulated facts. The Circuit Court held as a matter of law, 
that respondent had not committed a crime. 
24. Respondent expended $750.00 in attorney fees to defend 
himself in the criminal proceedings. CT pgs 79-80] 
S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T 
A summary of respondents' response and argument, is as follows: 
1. Probable cause to detain to search and probable cause 
to effect an arrest, are two separate and distinct matters. 2. 
Appellants are attempting to confuse the issue by claiming that 
the basis for stop to search is justification for making an 
arrest. It is appellants' arguments, and not the Court's ruling 
that are inconsistent. 
3. The damages awarded by the Court are insufficient, 
considering the totality of the circumstances. 
4. Under the prevailing case law, respondent is entitled 
to punitive damages as a matter of law. 
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5. Respondent was not convicted of any crime, and 
therefore there is nothing to be expunged. The respondent now 
has an arrest record, which cannot be expunged. Thus, the Court 
erred in holding that respondent's record could be expunged. 
6. Appellants' appeal is without merit. Respondent is 
entitled to his attorney fees on appeal as a matter of law. 
7. Respondent is entitled to pre-judgment interest as 
provided in §78-27-44 UCA. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T O N E 
T H E R E I S A D I F F E R E N C E B E T W E E N 
R R O O A O L . E C A U S E T O S E A R C H A N D 
R R O B A B L . E C A U S E T O A R R E S T 
Appellants correctly point out that "the determination of 
reasonableness and probable cause, which are requisites -for the 
statutory protection against -false arrest charges, is primarily a 
question of -fact to be resolved by the -finder of -fact. Terry M , 
Zior.s Coop, Mercantile Inst.. 605 P.2d 314, 320-321 <l?7?).s 
Even with that admission, appellants re-fuse to accept the 
plain and clear resolution o-f that issue by the trier o-f -fact. 
Appellants spend a great deal of their brief suggesting that if 
one has probable cause to stop another for the purpose of 
searching and ascertaining whether a crime has been committed, 
that the same constitutes probable cause to also arrest. 
55
 See Appellants'" Brief, page 7. 
The fallaciousness of appellants' argument is readily 
apparent. tohile the one act, stopping and detaining to search, 
may have been reasonable, to equate that right with the right to 
arrest is preposterous. Appellant cites §76-6-603, UCA, to 
support the right to detain and arrest, if the merchant has 
"probable" cause. In the proceedings below, respondent did not 
attempt to question the right of the appellant to stop, question 
and possibly search the respondent. However, once the appellant 
had accomplished that purpose, and once appellant had ascertained 
that respondent had nothing "concealed" on him, there was no 
probable cause or even a reasonable excuse for arresting 
respondent. There is a significant difference between the right 
to stop for the purpose of questioning and searching and actually 
arresting a person. The statute extends protection to those 
individuals who have "reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
the person detained or arrested committed a theft of goods held 
or displayed for sale." §77-7-14, UCA. (1987) [emphasis added].* 
Appellants seem to find solace in the provisions of §76-6-
604, UCA. Appellants would have the Court read "false arrest", 
"false imprisonment" and "unlawful detention", as being in the 
conjunctive, i.e., if one is authorised, then the others are 
justified. The fallacy of that argument is ascertained by 
reading the rest of the descriptions in the statute, i.e., 
* The applicable statute was amended in 1987 to provide 
"reasonable and probable cause" rather than grounds. There were 
other slight changes in the wording of the statute. None are 
particularly important to the outcome of this dispute. 
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"defamation of character, assault, trespass, or invasion of civil 
rights". The only logical interpretation that can be drawn -from 
appellants' argument is that the statute makes each o-f the 
enumerated acts conjunctive. If that were the case, then the 
logical extension o-f that argument is, if the merchant is 
justified in detaining an individual, and afterwards the merchant 
should, without provocation, assault that individual, then 
because the merchant was originally justified in stopping and 
searching the individual, the merchant is also justified in the 
assault. Such an argument is ludicrous. 
A reasonable and logical reading of §76-6-604 UCA indicates 
that each of the merchant's acts are to be considered in the 
disjunctive. In each instance, in order to avoid civil 
liability, the merchant must have probable cause and he must have 
"acted reasonably under all circumstances.11 [Emphasis added] It 
is readily apparent to the most casual, impartial observer, that 
appellants' argument is without merit. Respondent urges the 
Court to hold that probable cause to detain for a search and 
probable cause to effect an arrest, are two separate and distinct 
acts. The right to do one is not in and of itself the right to 
do the other. No other reading of the statute makes sense. 
Appellants also cite several opinions of the Utah Supreme 
Court, in criminal matters, to bolster their argument that even 
though respondent did not have any merchandise on him when 
searched, that appellants acted in good faith in arresting 
respondent.7" Even the most cursory reading of the cited cases 
suggest that appellants are not urging a fair or applicable 
interpretation. The most obvious differences between this matter 
and the cases cited, are as follows: 1. The cases cited were 
criminal; 2. The appellants had all been convicted by the Trier 
of Fact of having committed a crime; 3. The standard of review 
on appeal in a criminal case is whether the Court's decision is 
"against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made."0 
It apparently escaped appellants' recognition, but in this 
matter two different trier of the fact have determined, in 
essence, that there was no probable cause for appellants to have 
arrested respondent. It is undisputed that the Circuit Court 
granted respondent's motion to dismiss because under no possible 
stated facts was there any evidence a crime had been committed by 
anyone, much less respondent. The trial judge held that while 
the initial detention was justified, there was no justification 
or probable cause for the arrest. 
Appellants must realize that this is a civil case, and that 
there is ample evidence to support the findings of the trier of 
fact. Appellants must also realize that since there was 
* State v, UJatts, 63? P.2d 158, 162 (Utah 1981); State v. 
Eacile, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980) State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019. 
e
 State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); URCP 
52(a); and cited in State v. Goodman. 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, pq 3 
(Utah 1988). 
sufficient evidence before the trier of the fact to support the 
decision of the lower Court, that this Court will not reverse on 
appeal. 
P O I N T T W O 
C O U R T I S R U L I N G U I A S C O N S I S T T E N r r 
As indicated above, appellants are attempting to confuse the 
issue by claiming that the justification for detaining is 
justification for arrest.9 Appellants' Brief urges the 
proposition that the Trial Court's Ruling is internally 
inconsistent.10 In view of the arguments raised in Point One 
above, respondent would urge the Court to find that it is 
appellants' reasoning, and not the Court's ruling that is 
inconsistent. Justification to engage in a search is not 
justification to go beyond what a legal search would authorize. 
The Trial Court has found that the evidence preponderates against 
appellants. This Court should also find against appellants. 
P O I N T " T H R E E 
I N S U F F I C I E h s I C Y O F A W A R D E D D A M A G E S 
It is the duty of the trier of fact to assess damages. 
Damages should reflect the totality of all the facts and 
circumstances. Damages should not unfairly compensate the 
victim, but should be sufficiently adequate to compensate the 
* See Appellants' Brief, page 10. 
xo
 See Appellants' Brief, page 7. 
victim for the wrongs of the tortfeasor. Respondent recognizes 
that broad discretion is given the trier of fact to determine 
what those damages should be. 
The lower court found for respondent, but only awarded 
respondent $2,500.00 in general damages and $854.00 in specials. 
Respondent cross-appealed, claiming the same to be insufficient. 
The reasons respondent believes the damages awarded by the trial 
court are insufficient, are as follows8 
1. Respondent was only 18 years old at time complained of, 
and a senior in high school. 
2. Respondent stole nothing from appellants. 
3. Appellants with full knowledge that respondent had not 
stolen anything from them, still had him arrested. 
4. Respondent did not have a criminal or police record at 
the time appellants had respondent arrested. 
5. Appellants knew that by arresting respondent, he 
(respondent) would be booked, finger-printed, mug-shot and a 
permanent record of the arrest would be entered in the files and 
records of all law enforcement agencies. 
6. Respondent was humiliated in front of his friends and 
associates, by being falsely arrested for a crime that neither he 
nor anyone else committed. 
Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, the 
damages awarded by the Court are plainly insufficient. The 
Respondent respectively requests the Court of Appeals to remand 
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victim for the wrongs of the tortfeasor. Respondent recognizes 
that broad discretion is given the trier of fact to determine 
what those damages should be. 
The lower court found for respondent, but only awarded 
respondent $2,500.00 in general damages and $854.00 in specials. 
Respondent cross-appealed, claiming the same to be insufficient. 
The reasons respondent believes the damages awarded by the trial 
court are insufficient, are as follows* 
1. Respondent was only 18 years old at time complained of, 
and a senior in high school. 
2. Respondent stole nothing from appellants. 
3. Appellants with full knowledge that respondent had not 
stolen anything from them, still had him arrested. 
4. Respondent did not have a criminal or police record at 
the time appellants had respondent arrested. 
5. Appellants knew that by arresting respondent, he 
(respondent) would be booked, finger-printed, mug-shot and a 
permanent record of the arrest would be entered in the files and 
records of all law enforcement agencies. 
6. Respondent was humiliated in front of his friends and 
associates, by being falsely arrested for a crime that neither he 
nor anyone else committed. 
Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, the 
damages awarded by the Court are plainly insufficient. The 
Respondent respectively requests the Court of Appeals to remand 
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the matter to the Trial Court with instructions to review the 
damages, and award additional damages to the respondent. 
R E S P O N D E N T I S ElvlHT I T L E D 
T O P U N I T I V E D A M A G E S 
In the case of t^cFarland v. Skaoos Companies. Inc., 678 P.2d 
298 (Utah 1984) , Utah departed -from the standards adopted in 
Terry v. Zions Co-op, Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 
(1979), -for the award o-f punitive damages in a -false arrest case. 
In McFar1 and, the Court reviewed several other jurisdictions and 
"persuasive scholarly reasoning" to determine there was "a 
sufficient and sound basis . . -for departing from the malice in 
law standard followed in Terry. Accordingly, we adopt as the 
appropriate standard for determining the availability of a 
punitive damage award in an action for false imprisonment that of 
'malice in fact' or 'actual malice'." Cat pg. 304] 
Respondent recognizes that the present standard for awarding 
punitive damages is that of "malice in fact" or "actual malice" 
in a false arrest claim. When one considers the totality of the 
facts, especially appellants' knowledge that respondent had not 
stolen anything, together with appellants' understanding that 
once respondent was arrested he woula have a permanent arrest 
record, then the Court ought to conclude, that by the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence, the actions of appellants 
constitute actual malice or malice in fact. 
Respt'''''i"«iif " 11 eque£>ts t h e C o u r t t. o remand t. r e m a t t e r ; l i 
t r 1 a I c o u r t f oi"1 t h e p u r p o s e o f d e t e r i 1 • i "' ("iJ WLMJI 11 t l la i , o u y b t 
t o be a w a r d e d a s id- i tages. 
P O I isTI 
EXPUNGF^'iJ > ! ARREST RECORD 
it'H.. Lu i i ' 1 I i t - I d Mv.»1. (| i t :. a r r e s t r e c o r d ' • H*»| - o n o o n t 
c o u l d be e x p u n g e d , and i.hc r . i-1 «i . L. r i .HGL be damaged L«y t h e 
same • 11 i n i i • i ws de« I 11 iy w i t hi ex pungemen L d e a l s > i '•«\ 
conv i c: t; i one , J ,J 
The respondent was i ie ei coi i ic: ted of a crime . There ;i s no 
cr ") fii' n-i i < i ," 11 'j' I "'o be expunged,. there i*?t nnl v fne in.'d rri" m 
the a r r e s t , O f f i c e r Pat ton 1. est a f i I-.MI I I M I N I P .dir r "i; ",>t record had 
been sent to the FTfi" i«v-ye;d*" d I ess u* U'H- disposition of the 
II i in 11 "i I i; I h.u"ypw ., r e s p o n d e n t n o w h a s a p e r m a n e n t rerrn-ii i-ii i i L.« 
was arrested 111 Rooseve I T.
 T I II A\ I i n i r-n i vemDer 19 , 1 98S1.' t or 
shop! iftinq, !'!;• ,T< r. 11 i.j.t r e s p o n d e n t H <..*•"•• ! i f e , thai' record 
3-- .:>> t* who runs a confiilpnl I, 11 "beu.ir i t v 
^ ec-v rnc£' ..• r ••=,D7*r'r:ent . 
* ]ost ' / .i i p e r c e p t i o n i s o f t t i m e s w o r s e t h n i i 
1
 t h e r e . i r " : j r i 3rre?« " •• » " ( 
p e r c e i vec > « "u> J > " i > >, a s s o c i a t 3 o n . " 
Responds • • _. . . . l e u n i <*ny t. r i m e , arid t h e r e f o r e t h e f v i s 
iiol; h i n q !,. u oe e x p u n g e d . L. u a s c* * - > e ^ p o ider i t t o h a v e 
an a r r e s t r e c o r d , wh i r 11, eMounqe , 
The lower court erred when it ruled that the respondent 
would be able to expunge the record, and that respondent was not 
harmed by the same. 
ROirsTT KA1 
P R E J U D G M E N T I N T E R E S T 
The right to prejudgment interest on the damages arising 
from injuries arising out o-f a tort, is modified in §78-27-44, 
UCA. While appellants may argue that respondent is not entitled 
to prejudgment interest, the fact is that the legislature has 
made it clear that the same is a right of respondent. The Trial 
Court did not &rr by awarding the same. 
ROirsITT KS1 I 
A T T O R N E Y S F E E S O N A R R E ^ L 
Respondent would respectively suggest that appellants' 
appeal has been frivolous and without merit. The time spent in 
preparing respondent's reply, and subsequent appearance before 
the Court, should be compensated by the appellants. The 
legislature has made it the public policy of this state to impose 
attorney fees where the action is without merit or brought in bad 
faith. See §78-27-56, UCA. 
Respondent respectfully requests that he be awarded his 
attorneys fees and other expenses on appeal . 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Probable cause to detain to search and probable cause to 
effect an arrest, are two separate and distinct matters. 
Appellants are attempting to confuse the issue by claiming that 
the right to stop to search is justification for making an 
arrest. It is appellants' arguments, and not the Court's ruling 
that are inconsistent. 
The damages awarded by the Court are insufficient, 
considering the totality of the circumstances. Further, under 
the circumstances, appellants' actions towards respondent ought 
to be held to have been actual malice or malice in fact. Under 
the prevailing case law, respondent is entitled to punitive 
damages as a matter of law. 
Respondent was not convicted of any crime, and therefore 
there is nothing to be expunged. Appellants have caused 
respondent to have an arrest record, which cannot be expunged. 
The lower court erred in holding that respondent's record could 
be expunged. 
Appellants' appeal is without merit. Respondent is entitled 
to his attorney fees on appeal as a matter of law. Respondent is 
entitled to pre-judgment interest as provided in §78-27-44 UCA. 
Dated this 10th day of November, 1988. 
George E. Mangan 
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